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Abstract This paper criticizes Soames’s main argument against a variant of
two-dimensionalism that he calls strong two-dimensionalism. The idea of Soames’s
argument is to show that the strong two-dimensionalist’s semantics for belief
ascriptions delivers wrong semantic verdicts about certain complex modal sentences
that contain both such ascriptions and claims about the truth of the ascribed beliefs.
A closer look at the formal semantics underlying strong two-dimensionalism reveals
that there are two feasible ways of specifying the truth conditions for claims of the
latter sort. Only one of the two yields the problematic semantic verdicts, so strong
two-dimensionalists can avoid Soames’s argument by settling for the other way.
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1 Introduction
Scott Soames’s book Reference and Description. The Case Against Two-Dimen-
sionalism delivers the most thorough critique of two-dimensionalism to date. This
paper focuses on Soames’s Argument 1, which targets one specific variety of the
theory, strong two-dimensionalism.1 Argument 1 is of central importance to
Soames’s critique of strong two-dimensionalism, as it provides the basic structure
for his further arguments.2 Soames coins the term strong two-dimensionalism to
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1 See Soames (2005b) for the original formulation of the argument. The argument is reproduced in
Soames (2006) and, in a notational variant, in Soames (2005a).
2 I agree with Dever concerning this point. See Dever (2007, pp. 9–10).
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refer to a variant of two-dimensionalism that is based on ideas found in Chalmers
(1996) and Jackson (1998). Argument 1 specifically targets the semantics for belief
ascriptions associated with strong two-dimensionalism. This is quite surprising, since
Soames acknowledges that an explicit semantics for belief ascriptions is put forward
in neither of the two books.3 Independently of whether Soames is correct in
attributing strong two-dimensionalism to these two authors, the proposed strong two-
dimensionalist semantics of belief ascriptions deserves serious attention, since it is
the most straight-forward implementation of such a semantics available to a two-
dimensionalist. Soames specifies this part of the semantics in one of a number of core
theses that together constitute his characterization of strong two-dimensionalism.
The main argument of this paper is based on the observation that these core theses
fail to determine a unique semantic treatment of claims about the truth of a belief that
is ascribed to an individual. As it turns out, strong two-dimensionalists are left with a
choice of two alternative formal semantics for such claims. I will argue that only one
of the two renders strong two-dimensionalists vulnerable to Argument 1 and that the
other options allows them to avoid the argument.4
2 Two-dimensional semantics
The main focus of this paper is on the formal semantics underlying strong two-
dimensionalism and on the claims made about such a semantics in the premises of
Soames’s Argument 1. As a consequence, many important philosophical questions
about two-dimensionalism in general, e.g., the question of what it means that
another world could have turned out as actual, will have to be left unanswered. The
current section attempts to briefly introduce some fundamental concepts and
philosophical motivations behind two-dimensionalism. As I see it, the two
fundamental ideas of two-dimensional semantics are first, that each natural
language expression is associated with two intensions, a primary and a secondary
intension5, and second, that these two kinds of intensions can be defined as
functions that take two different kinds of possible worlds as their arguments. If the
focus is on sentences rather then on sub-sentential expressions, these two basic ideas
can alternatively be framed in terms of primary and secondary propositions.
The secondary intension corresponds to the familiar intension from possible
worlds-semantics. Formally, it is represented by a function that assigns semantic
values to possible worlds, which are called worlds considered as counterfactual or
3 Soames finds Jackson to be ‘[…] less than fully explicit […]’ (Soames 2005b, p. 172) about the
semantics of attitude ascriptions, but argues that he should be understood as implicitly endorsing the
strong two-dimensionalist proposal (See Soames (2005b, pp. 173–175)). Concerning Chalmers, Soames
admits that ‘[…] he has very little explicitly to say about the semantics of propositional attitude
ascriptions in The Conscious Mind.’ (Soames 2005b, p. 235).
4 A different perspective on Argument 1 has recently been offered in Dever (2007). I largely agree with
Dever’s diagnosis of his more abstract reconstruction of Argument 1, but I also think that Soames’s
original formulation of the argument raises important issues concerning the two-dimensionalist treatment
of belief ascriptions that are lost in Dever’s reconstruction.
5 Some authors call them 1- and 2-Intensions or A- and B-Intensions, respectively.
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simply worlds. In case of a rigid expression, this function assigns the same semantic
value to all worlds of this kind. In this picture, which can be seen as a generalization
of the theory of reference sketched in Kripke (1980), reference-fixing happens in the
actual world. The value assigned to a rigid designator in the actual world hence
determines the values assigned to it with respect to all other worlds. But according
to two-dimensionalism, the actual world is merely one among several candidates
that could have turned out to be the actual world. These candidate-worlds are called
worlds considered as actual. Two-dimensionalists hold that different worlds
considered as actual may fix different references for a given expression, so that the
expression may have different secondary intensions with respect to different worlds
considered as actual.
The primary intension of an expression is defined as a function from worlds
considered as actual to semantic values. Its job is to assign to each expression the
extension that it would have, had that world turned out as actual. Thereby, it also
determines the secondary intension relative to that world considered as actual. There
seems to be a consensus about the formal definition of the primary intension among
recent proponents of two-dimensionalism, but there is a considerable controversy
about its philosophical interpretation.6
One idea common to most variants of two-dimensionalism is that the primary
intension captures an epistemic aspect of meaning and that secondary intensions
capture an alethic, or metaphysical, aspect of meaning. This idea is also instrumental
to the two-dimensionalist explanation of the necessary a posteriori: A sentence is
necessary and a posteriori if and only if it has a contingent primary and a necessary
secondary proposition. Similarly, a sentence is contingent and a priori if and only if it
has a necessary primary and a contingent secondary proposition. This elegant
semantic explanation is one of the biggest selling points of two-dimensionalism.
3 The formal apparatus
3.1 Syntax
The formal language used in this paper contains the following symbols:
A set of constants for atomic sentences P ¼ fp; q; r; . . .g
A set of unary operators U ¼ f:;h; ;@; B; Trg
A set of binary operators B ¼ f^;_;!g
Parentheses (,)
Besides the usual logical symbols and the two modal operators h for ‘It is
necessary that…’ and  for ‘It is possible that…’, the formal language contains the
‘actually’-operator @ and the two belief-related operators B and Tr.7 The sentences
of the language are recursively built up according to the following rules:
6 See Chalmers (2006) for a comprehensive discussion of different interpretations of the primary
intension and of Chalmers’s favoured epistemic interpretation of two-dimensional semantics.
7 Formulas that occur in prose sentences are sometimes mentioned, sometimes used. I will take the
liberty of omitting the usual quotes.
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Each / 2 P is a sentence.
If / is a sentence and  2 U; ð/Þ is a sentence.
If / and w are sentences and  2 B; ð/  wÞ is a sentence.
Parentheses will be omitted where permissible, as e.g., in :/:
3.2 Semantics
Sentences are evaluated with respect to a strong two-dimensionalist model M ¼
hW ; C; v; bi: Each model contains a set of worlds considered as actual c1; . . .; cn 2 C
and a set of worlds considered as counterfactual w1; . . .; wn 2 W : There is an
ongoing debate among two-dimensionalists about the relation between the two
kinds of worlds. The members of C are usually taken to be centred worlds, ordered
sets that contain an individual, a world and possibly other parameters that are
needed for the evaluation of indexical or context sensitive expressions. The only
indexical operator that appears in my discussion of Soames’s Argument 1 is the
‘actually’-operator @, which is sensitive to the world contained in the world
considered as actual. For the purposes of this paper, all parameters except for the
contained world can therefore safely be ignored. This means that in principle, we
could do with models that contain only W, but I will nonetheless rely on models
with both C and W, since the semantics is clearer if the two kinds of worlds are kept
apart. An exception to this rule will be made for cases in which the relevant world is
shifted to the world contained in the world considered as actual. The world
considered as actual will in this case be taken to replace the relevant world, which
allows for a simplification of the semantics for @. Lower case letters without
subscripts, e.g., w; w0; . . .; are used as variables ranging over the members of these
sets. Each model contains a valuation function v 2 fF : P 7!PðC  WÞg; which
assigns to sentences in P a set of pairs of a world considered as actual and a world
considered as counterfactual hc; wi: The second function b 2 fF : C  W 7!PðCÞg
assigns sets of worlds considered as actual to a pair of a world considered as actual
and a world. This function determines the primary propositions relevant to the
evaluation of B. A word on the operator B and the presented model theory in
general: The model theory used throughout this paper is tailor-made for the analysis
of Soames’s Argument 1. Since the sentences that need to be evaluated for this
purpose involve only the beliefs of one individual, the model theory is not designed
to account for the beliefs of multiple individuals. Throughout the paper, B (/) is
simply read as ‘Mary believes that /’, since Mary is the only individual that figures
in Soames’s example sentences. The same goes for the operator Tr, the semantics of
which will be introduced later.8,9
8 The syntax and the semantics could easily be modified to account for the beliefs of multiple individuals
by adding a set of indexed belief-operators to the language, by adding a set of individuals I to the model
and by replacing b by b0 2 fF : I  C  W 7!PðCÞg: Worlds considered as actual could then be identified
with tupels of a world and an individual hw; ii (centered worlds).
9 Note that models as defined above lack the accessibility-relation one comes to expect in a modal
semantics. This simplification is unproblematic in the context of this paper, since such a relation plays no
role in Soames’s argument.
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M; c; w p iff hc; wi 2 vðpÞ
M; c; w:/ iff M; c; w= /
M; c; w ð/ ^ wÞ iff M; c; w  / and M; c; w  w
M; c; wh/ iff for all w0 : M; c; w0  /
M; c; w@/ iff M; c; c  /
M; c; wBð/Þ iff bðhc; wiÞ  /½ ½ M1
As explained above, the world considered as actual is allowed to take the place of a
world in the semantics for @.10 The semantics for B captures the two-dimensionalist
idea that we can say truly of someone that she believes /, if she is adequately
related to /’s primary proposition. The logical connectives _;!;$ and the
possibility operator  are defined in the usual way. If it is clear from the context
which model is being considered, the model will sometimes not be mentioned
explicitly.
In the course of the paper, reference will be made to primary and secondary
propositions, which correspond to the primary and secondary intensions of
sentences. Based on the idea that propositions are sets of possible worlds, the
primary intension /½ ½ M1 and the secondary intension /½ ½ M;c2 of a sentence / are
defined in the following way:
/½ ½ M1 ¼ fc : M; c; c/g
/½ ½ M;c2 ¼ fw : M; c; w/g
The primary proposition of a sentence / relative to a model M is the set of worlds
considered as actual in which / is true. It corresponds to the top-left to bottom-right
diagonal of /’s two-dimensional matrix with respect to M (M -matrix for short). The
secondary proposition of a sentence / with respect to a models M and a world
considered as actual c is the set of worlds considered as counterfactual, in which / is
true relative to c. This means that secondary propositions correspond to the rows of /
’s M-matrix. The mentioned matrices are handy illustrations of the distribution of
truth values in a two-dimensionalist model. Table 1 gives an example of such a
matrix that illustrates a simple model for a necessary but a posteriori sentence q.
There are some significant terminological differences between the characteriza-
tion of strong two-dimensionalism on pp. 133–139 of Soames (2005b) and the
formal semantics presented here. Soames’s characterization relies on Kaplan’s
concepts of context and character and, in his formulation of the semantics for belief
ascriptions, on the concept of the primary intension. In the given semantics, the role
10 The idea underlying the semantics for the ‘actually’-operator @ is that ‘actually’ shifts the semantic
focus to the current world considered as actual. A formally similar semantics for ‘actually’ is discussed in
Cresswell (1990), chapter 3. The major alternative for a two-dimensionalist is a semantics that lets @
shift the world under consideration to a fixed world that is specified as a part of the model. This approach
requires a different model theory, the classical exposition of which can be found in Davies and
Humberstone (1980). The approach pursued in the current paper is briefly mentioned on p. 4–5 and in
notes 4 and 5 on p. 26 of Davies and Humberstone (1980). My main argument can be made given either
kind of model theory.
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of contexts is played by the members of C. This should be fairly uncontroversial,
since formally, Kaplanian contexts contain a world plus an individual, a position
and a time. According to Soames, a sentence S’s ‘primary intension is a proposition
which is true with respect to all and only those contexts C to which the Kaplan-style
character of S assigns a proposition that is true at C.’ (Soames (2005b), p. 133)
Kaplan defines the character as the function which assigns a content to a sentence
relative to a model and a context.11 In the given semantics, the character of a
sentence corresponds to a function which assigns secondary propositions to a
sentence relative to a model and a world considered as actual. A sentence s can be
said to be true in a world considered as actual in a model M if and only if
M; c; c s: Given this definition, the character of s assigns a secondary proposition
that is true in a world considered as actual to exactly the worlds considered as actual
that are members of s’s primary proposition. Hence, the primary intension of a
sentence directly corresponds to the primary proposition in the given semantics.
4 Soames’s argument 1
Argument 1 is presented in five steps, the first four acting as premises, the last
containing both the final premise and the conclusion. Since the first step merely
reiterates the strong two-dimensionalist’s semantics for belief ascriptions, I will
focus on the remaining four steps:
Step 2 Since in every context C, the character of sentence (1a) expresses a truth
with respect to C iff the character of sentence (1b) does too, the two
primary intensions are identical, and the ascriptions
A believes that the actual husband of Stephanie Lewis was the actual
author of Counterfactuals.
and
A believes that the husband of Stephanie Lewis was the author of
Counterfactuals.
are necessarily equivalent. (In fact their secondary intensions, as well as
their primary intensions, are identical.)
Step 3 Hence, the truth value of
a. It is a necessary truth that [if the actual husband of Stephanie Lewis
was the actual author of Counterfactuals and Mary believes that the
actual husband of Stephanie Lewis is the actual author of Counter-
factuals, then Mary believes something true].
is the same as the truth value of
Table 1 M0-matrix for q w1 w2
c1 True True
c2 False False
11 Compare the definition of content on p. 546 and the definition of character on p. 548 of Kaplan (1989).
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b. It is a necessary truth that [if the actual husband of Stephanie Lewis
was the actual author of Counterfactuals and Mary believes that the
husband of Stephanie Lewis is the author of Counterfactuals, then
Mary believes something true].
Since (b) is false, so is (a).
Step 4 Similarly, the truth value of
a. It is a necessary truth that [if Mary believes that the actual husband of
Stephanie Lewis was the actual author of Counterfactuals, and if that
belief is true, then the actual husband of Stephanie Lewis is the actual
author of Counterfactuals].
is the same as the truth value of
b. It is a necessary truth that [if Mary believes that the husband of
Stephanie Lewis was the author of Counterfactuals, and if that belief is
true, then the actual husband of Stephanie Lewis was the actual author
of Counterfactuals].
Since (b) is false, so is (a).
Step 5 Since, in fact the a-sentences in steps 3 and 4 are true, the strong two-
dimensionalist theses T5a and T5b are not jointly true. (Soames (2005b),
pp. 272–273. Underlines in Step 2 omitted.)12
In the terminology of the given formal semantics, the main claim of Step 2 is
that, according to strong two-dimensionalism, the beliefs ascribed to A in the two
sentences in italics have the same primary proposition and are therefore necessarily
equivalent. Is this claim correct? Let p represent Soames’s sentence (1a) ‘The
husband of Stephanie Lewis was the author of Counterfactuals.’ The natural
formalization of (1b) ‘The actual husband of Stephanie Lewis was the actual author
of Counterfactuals.’ then is @ p.13 In a model M; the two sentences have the same
primary proposition. This is a direct consequence of the semantics for @ and the
definition of the primary proposition. Since B is sensitive only to the primary
proposition and p and @ p have the same primary proposition, B(p) and B(@ p) are
equivalent. They are also necessarily equivalent. The necessity of a sentence is
determined by its secondary intension alone, which plays no part in determining the
truth value of these two sentences.14 The claim in parentheses is also correct. In any
given model, B (p) and B (@ p) have an identical primary proposition and are
assigned the same secondary propositions.
Step 2 sets up the main part of the argument by drawing attention to the fact that
the two belief ascriptions B (p) and B (@ p) are necessarily equivalent in strong
12 T5a and T5b are introduced on pp. 268–269 of Soames (2005b). The semantics for h and B captures
the contents of the two definitions, so I will not quote them here.
13 The formalization treats sentences of the form ‘The actual F is the actual G’ and ‘Actually, the F is the
G’, where F and G are definite descriptions, as having the same meaning. This is unproblematic in the
context of this paper.
14 More precisely: Assume that logical truth is defined in the following way: / is a logical truth iff for
every M; for c 2 C 2 M; for w 2 W 2 M; M; c; w/: Given this definition, ðBð/Þ $ Bð@/ÞÞ is a
logical truth of strong two-dimensionalism, since per definition /½ ½ M1 ¼ @/½ ½ M1 :
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two-dimensional semantics. The main aim of Argument 1 is to exploit this fact.
Soames aims to show that strong two-dimensionalists commit themselves to an
intuitively false semantic verdict about certain complex sentences containing belief
ascriptions embedded under a necessity operator. In the following two sections,
I propose a formalization of these complex sentences that makes them apt for
semantic evaluation in strong two-dimensional semantics. The remaining steps of
the argument will be discussed in Sect. 7.
5 The (a)- and (b)-sentences
In order to evaluate the claims made about the (a)- and (b)-sentences in Steps 3 and
4, the sentences have to be translated into the given formal language. To do this,
I will introduce the new operator Tr (/), which is read as ‘Mary’s belief that / is
true’. With Tr, we can formalize the four sentences from Steps 3 and 4 in the
following way:
(3a) @p B @p Tr @p
(3b) @p B p Tr p
(4a) B @p Tr @p @p
(4b) B p Tr p @p
6 Truth conditions for Tr
While Soames specifies how a strong two-dimensionalist evaluates belief ascrip-
tions, his characterization of the theory does not specify a semantics for Tr. The
most likely explanation for this omission is that the strong two-dimensionalist
semantics for B seems to imply that the truth or falsity of a subject’s belief / is
determined solely by /’s primary proposition. But even if it is granted that the
primary proposition does all the semantic work with respect to B, there is more to be
said about the semantics of Tr. The point is easy to illustrate if one thinks of the two-
dimensional matrix associated with a sentence that Tr is applied to. The cells of such
a matrix correspond to world pairs of the form hc; wi: The cells in the top-left to
bottom-right diagonal represent those world pairs of this form for which w 2 c:
Since c already provides w for any such cell, these cells can simply be referred to as
corresponding to c. I will call them on-diagonal cells. Since they represent the
primary proposition of the sentence, there is no question to answer about the
semantics for Tr relative to these cells of the matrix. Off-diagonal cells on the other
hand represent world pairs hc; wi for which w 62 c: Since per assumption, the truth
value of Tr (/) is determined by /’s primary proposition alone, the semantics has to
specify which on-diagonal cell is to be considered, if Tr (/) is evaluated with
respect to off-diagonal cells that do not correspond to the primary proposition.
There are two prima facie plausible ways of doing this in the given semantics. Here
is the first one:
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PT1 M; c; wTrð/Þ iff c 2 /½ ½ M1 and 9c0; w0 so that M; c0; w0 	 Bð/Þ:
The first part of the definiens of PT1 tells us that Tr is sensitive to the on-diagonal
cell that corresponds to the provided world considered as actual c. The second part
specifies the requirement that there be a pair of a world considered as actual c0 and a
world w0 with respect to which the belief in question is held. Since it does not make
sense to talk about the truth of a belief if that belief is not held at all, a requirement
of this kind must be part of any semantics for Tr. The existential quantification is
needed because there are cases in which we may want to assess the truth of a
subject’s belief with respect to a pair of a world considered as actual and a world,
independently of whether the subject holds that belief with respect to this world
pair. E.g., a strong two-dimensionalist might want to say that Johann’s actually false
belief that p could be true relative to a world pair where he holds the false belief that
:p; even though p is true there.15
The second proposal is the following:
PT2 M; c; wTrð/Þ
iff for c0 such that w 2 c0; c0 2 /½ ½ M1 and 9c00; w0 so that M; c00; w0 	 Bð/Þ:
While PT1 tells us to look at the on-diagonal cell that corresponds to the current
world considered as actual, PT2 tells us to look at the on-diagonal cell
corresponding to the world considered as actual c0 that contains the provided
world considered as counterfactual.16 PT1 and PT2 are the only sensible ways of
defining truth conditions for Tr based on the primary proposition.
Strong two-dimensionalism does also allow us to specify a semantics based on
the secondary proposition:
ST M; c; w Trð/Þ iff w 2 /½ ½ M;c2 and 9c0; w0so that M; c0; w0 	 Bð/Þ
ST delivers the same results as PT1 and PT2 for world pairs that correspond to
on-diagonal cells. With respect to pairs corresponding to off-diagonal cells, ST
simply makes Tr sensitive to the world in the off-diagonal cell under consideration.
This means that ST effectively makes Tr a vacuous operator, if there is a true
instance of the corresponding belief ascription in the respective model: Given ST
and a true instance of B(/) in M; a world w is in /½ ½ M;c2 if and only if M; c; w/
if and only if M; c; wTrð/Þ:
All three proposals deliver the same results with respect to world pairs
representing on-diagonal cells. This means that only the different semantic
treatment of world pairs representing off-diagonal cells can serve as a criterion
for selecting among the proposals.
15 A more compelling example can be given in a model that contains more than one individual: Johann’s
actually false belief that Johann does not exist could rightly be said to be true with respect to a world
considered as actual that contains a subject other than Johann, in which Johann does not exist and in
which he consequently entertains no beliefs.
16 Disregarding the requirement that the relevant belief is held by the respective individual somewhere in
the model, we can say that roughly, PT1 corresponds to Lewis’s operator
y
and PT2 corresponds to
Stalnaker’s operator y. See Stalnaker (1978), p. 319f and Lewis (1973), p. 63f.
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I think that PT1 should be rejected, because it delivers intuitively wrong results
with respect to world pairs representing off-diagonal cells: If it is true that Mary
believes that giant pandas are an endangered species with respect to the world
considered as actual c which contains the world w, where they are, would her belief
also be true relative to a world considered as counterfactual w0, where giant pandas
are not endangered? Her belief should surely be false with respect to w0, but PT1
tells us that her belief is true, since it is true in w. PT1’s flaw is that it completely
disregards the off-diagonal cells and hence the non-actual worlds considered as
counterfactual.
PT2 and ST on the other hand provide two distinct, yet equally sensible ways of
handling off-diagonal cells. PT2 gives Tr what I would like to call an empathetic
reading. Applied to the given example, a PT2-based semantics tells us to think about
whether Mary’s belief would be true, if the world considered as actual c0, which
contains the non-actual world w0 had turned out to be actual. If c0 had turned out to
be the actual world, her belief could not be said to be true, since then giant pandas
would not actually be an endangered species. This reading of Tr asks us to consider
what would be the case if the non-actual world that we are considering as
counterfactual would have been actual.
ST tells us to keep considering c as the actual world and to think about whether
Mary’s belief corresponds to how things are in the counterfactual world w0 from the
perspective of c. Hence, ST also yields the expected result of rendering the belief
false. The ST-based reading of Tr could be called factual.17
Which of the two remaining interpretations of Tr should a strong two-
dimensionalist adopt? Since both appear to be coherent and since Soames’s
discussion of strong two-dimensionalist provides no clear incentive to prefer one
over the other, I will from now on consider two versions of strong two-
dimensionalism, one with PT2 and one with ST.
7 Analysing argument 1
Argument 1 aims to show that strong two-dimensionalism contradicts an intuitive
semantic judgement of the (a)- and (b)-sentences in Steps 3 and 4.18 I will only
focus on Step 3 of the argument. This decision will be justified after a few
considerations about the proposed analysis of the argument. Soames assumes that
strong two-dimensionalists are committed to the following two claims about the
(a)- and (b)-sentences in Step 3 and 4:
17 The two proposals notably differ in their treatment of instances of @ in sentences of the form Tr (@ /).
Given PT2, @ is vacuous if it occurs embedded under Tr, so the equivalence Trð/Þ $ Trð@/Þ holds. This
equivalence does not generally hold given ST.
18 I am not convinced that we have reliable theory-independent intuitions about the truth values of
complex modal sentences of the kind in question, but I accept Soames’s claim for the sake of the
argument.
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1. (a) and (b) have the same truth value.
2. (b) is false and therefore (a) is also false.
In Step 5 of the argument, these semantic commitments are played out against the
intuitive judgement that the (a)-sentences are in fact true, giving Argument 1 the
form of a reductio ad absurdum: The idea is that assuming strong two-
dimensionalism leads us to an intuitively unacceptable semantic verdict about the
(a)-sentences. The conclusion, which is contained in Step 5, provides a diagnosis of
what led to this wrong verdict: The combination of the strong two-dimensionalist
core theses T5a and T5b19, which specify the semantics for the necessity operator
and for belief ascriptions respectively. In a notational variant of the argument
published elsewhere, Soames draws the alternative conclusion that ‘[…] modal and
epistemic operators in English do not take systematically different objects.’
(Soames 2005a, p. 414.)
In this section, Soames’s two claims are put to the test. In order to semantically
evaluate the (a)- and (b)-sentences, we need an adequate model. Such a model
should be constructed in a way so that it does not preclude the truth of the intuitive
judgement that the (a)-sentences are true. Semantic intuitions supporting such a
judgement have to be rooted in an intuitive theory of meaning. Given that such a
theory should roughly track our true judgements about the world we live in, the
model has to contain a world that accommodates the facts relevant to the semantic
evaluation of the (a)-sentences as they are in our world. This will be the world w1, in
which the husband of Stephanie Lewis was the author of Counterfactuals, making p
true in w1.
20 The world considered as actual c1 contains this world w1. Any
genuinely two-dimensionalist model has to provide more than one world that can be
considered as actual. To keep things simple and since no further worlds are needed,
the model will contain only one such world c2. This world considered as actual
contains the world w2, in which the husband of Stephanie Lewis was not the author
of Counterfactuals and in which p is therefore false. The sentences B (/) and Tr (/)
will again be read as statements about beliefs held by Mary. In the (a)- and (b)-
sentences, a belief of either p or @p is ascribed to Mary. Each such ascription
occurs in the antecedent of a conditional that is embedded under a necessity-
operator. It follows from the truth-functional definition of ? and the semantics for
h that the corresponding (a)- or (b)-sentence is true if the respective belief is
wrongly ascribed to Mary. In such a case, the whole argument collapses, since the
second claim about strong two-dimensionalism in Step 3 (and Step 4) is falsified.
The simplest way to exclude these cases and to save the argument from immediate
collapse, is to let b be such that B(p) and B(@p) are true with respect to all world
pairs. Since p and @p share the same primary intension, this amounts to a single
constraint on b. Based on these considerations, the model can be specified in the
following way (see also Tables 2, 3):
19 See footnote 12.
20 Note that the truth value of p is not sensitive to the world considered as actual since it contains no
indexical element.
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M1 ¼ hW ; C; v; bi
W ¼ fw1; w2g
C ¼ fc1; c2g
vðpÞ ¼ fhc1; w1i; hc2; w1ig
b ¼ fhc1; w1i7!fc1g; hc1; w2i7!fc1g; hc2; w1i7!fc1g; hc2; w2i7!fc1gg;
Since the focus will be squarely on M1 from now on, I will take advantage of a
simplification of the (a)- and (b)-sentences allowed with respect to this model. B (p)
and B(@ p) are true with respect to all world pairs hc; wi: Each such belief
ascription appears in a conjunction in the antecedent of a conditional. This means
that the truth value of each such conditional with respect to a world pair is
completely determined by the other conjunct in the antecedent and by the
consequent. With respect to M1; the (a)- and (b)-sentences can therefore be
simplified in the following way:
(3a*) @p Tr @p
(3b*) @p Tr p
(4a*) Tr @p @p
(4b*) Tr p @p
I will first state the truth conditions for these simplified sentences and then use
M1-matrices to illustrate their truth values with respect to the model. This will be
done once for the version of strong two-dimensional semantics with PT2 and once
for the version with ST. In both cases, the requirement that the belief is being held in
at least one world pair in the relevant model, which is part of the truth conditions for
both semantics for Tr, is trivially fulfilled with respect to M1: Hence, this
requirement can also safely be disregarded here. The purpose of this section is to
investigate whether Soames’s claims from Step 3 actually hold for the two versions
of strong two-dimensional semantics and whether both verify the intuitive
judgement about the truth of the (a)-sentences from Step 5. The focus will
therefore be on the world considered as actual c1, which represents our world
considered as actual in M1:
So why will only Step 3 of the argument be considered? The semantics for @ and
the truth-functional definition of the material conditional ? together guarantee the
Table 2 M1-matrix for p w1 w2
c1 True False
c2 True False
Table 3 M1-matrix for @p w1 w2
c1 True True
c2 False False
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truth of (4a) and (4b) with respect to any world considered as actual in which p is
true. As p is true with respect to c1, both sentences are necessarily true with respect
to c1, so Soames’s second claim from Step 4 is false. This is the case with PT2 and
with ST, which means that Step 4 is completely ineffective as a component of an
argument against strong two-dimensional semantics as understood in this paper.
Hence only Step 3 needs to be considered. A compact overview of the results of the
following subsections can be found in Sect. 8.
7.1 Step 3: strong two-dimensional semantics with PT2
7.1.1 PT2: truth conditions for (3a*)
M; c; whð@p ! Trð@pÞÞ
iff for all w0; either M; c; c2 p or, for c0such that w0 2 c0; c0 2 @p½ ½ M1 :
(See Table 4)
7.1.2 PT2: truth conditions for (3b*)
M; c; whð@p ! TrðpÞÞ iff for all w0; either M; c; c2 p or, for c0such that
w0 2 c0; c0 2 p½ ½ M1 :
(See Table 5)
7.1.3 PT2: summary
Given PT2, (3a*) and (3b*) have the same truth values with respect to both c1 and
c2. This means that Soames’s first claim is true in M1 concerning this variant of
strong two-dimensional semantics. His second claim is true with respect to c1, but
false with respect to c2. Given our focus on c1, the second claim can also be
considered true with respect to M1:
Table 5 PT2: M1-matrix for
(3b*)
w1 w2
c1 False False
c2 True True
Table 4 PT2: M1-matrix for
(3a*)
w1 w2
c1 False False
c2 True True
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7.2 Step 3: strong two-dimensional semantics with ST
7.2.1 ST: truth conditions for (3a*)
M; c; whð@p ! Trð@pÞÞ iff for all w0; either M; c; c2 p or w0 2 @p½ ½ M;c2 :
(Table 6)
7.2.2 ST: truth conditions for (3b*)
M; c; whð@p ! TrðpÞÞ iff for all w0; either M; c; c2 p or w0 2 p½ ½ M;c2 :
(Table 7)
7.2.3 ST: summary
The first claim from Step 3 does not hold in M1 : Given strong two-dimensional
semantics with ST, (3a*) and (3b*) differ in truth value with respect to c1. As a
consequence, the second claim does also not hold, since (3a*) is true, (3b*) false
with respect to c1.
7.3 Step 5
As was noted earlier, Step 5 contains both the last premise of Argument 1 and its
conclusion. The last premise claims that (3a) is true. This is the intuitive semantic
judgement that strong two-dimensionalists are supposedly unable to account for.
But the semantic evaluations show that strong two-dimensional semantics with ST
can account for the intuitive judgement for (3a*) with respect to M1: Strong two-
dimensional semantics with PT2 on the other hand renders (3a*) false with respect
to the same model. A strong two-dimensionalist who wants to accommodate the
semantic intuition that the (a)-sentences are true is therefore well advised to choose
ST over PT2. Concerning the conclusion of the argument, a very similar point can
be made. Given ST, the two crucial claims made in Step 3 are both rendered false in
the model under consideration. Hence, as a strong two-dimensionalist, one should
Table 6 ST: M1-matrix for
(3a*)
w1 w2
c1 True True
c2 True True
Table 7 ST: M1-matrix for
(3b*)
w1 w2
c1 False False
c2 True True
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adopt ST rather than PT2, since given ST, Argument 1 has a false premise and is
therefore unsound.
8 PT2 versus ST
Table 8 illustrates the results from the previous section: ? indicates that Soames’s
claims apply to the version of strong two-dimensional semantics indicated on the
left with respect to c1 in M1;
 indicates that they do not. The two positions in the
first column correspond to Soames’s two claims from Step 3. The second column
indicates whether Soames is right in claiming that the semantics fails to account for
the intuitive truth of the (a)-sentence from Step 3.
There are three lesson to be drawn from the given analysis of Soames’s
Argument 1. First, if PT2 was the only feasible semantics for Tr, the argument (sans
Step 4) would be effective. Second, strong two-dimensionalists who adopt ST can,
contrary to Soames’s claim, account for the semantic intuition that the (a)-sentences
are true. Third, with ST in place, the strong two-dimensionalist’s semantics fails to
conform to the crucial assumptions made for the purpose of a reductio ad absurdum
in Argument 1’s premises, so the threat of the argument is completely neutralised.
These seem good reasons to draw the conclusion that strong two-dimensionalists
should adopt ST. The given argument however also offers a clear perspective to
their adversaries: A convincing argument against ST would suffice to reinstate
Argument 1. In the last section of this paper, I will discuss one important candidate
for such an argument.
9 An argument against ST
Unlike PT2, ST semantically detaches Tr from the primary intension and hence
from B. A strong two-dimensionalist who adopts ST is committed to the view that
the question of whether one holds a certain belief is settled by one’s relation to the
relevant primary proposition, while the question of whether what one believes is
true is settled by the relevant secondary proposition. This means that strong two-
dimensional semantics with ST violates a certain metaphysical constraint on
semantic theories, namely the constraint that in cases where a subject’s belief is said
to be true, there should be one unique proposition that plays both the role of the truth
bearer and provides the object of the belief. As a consequence, a strong two-
dimensionalist prima facie has to deny that a sentence like ‘There is something such
that Mary believes it and it is true.’ can express a truth. This gives us the following
argument against ST: ST violates the metaphysical constraint. The metaphysical
Table 8 Overview of the
results
Step 3 (3a*)
with PT2 ?/? ?
with ST -/- -
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constraint must be met by any adequate semantic theory. Therefore, strong two-
dimensionalists cannot adopt ST. I take this to be a valid argument. If the argument
is also sound, the proposed strong two-dimensionalist reply to Argument 1 is
blocked. In this section, I will briefly discuss three different responses to this
argument against ST.21
The first response denies the first premise and attempts to explain away the
conflict between the semantic theory and the metaphysical constraint. To do this, the
quantifier in a sentence like ‘There is something such that Mary believes it and it is
true.’ is given a non-objectual reading. This reading allows the friend of ST to
account for the possible truth of this sentence without incurring ontological
commitment to one unique proposition that is quantified over.22 It is then claimed
that this suffices to meet the metaphysical constraint. A general problem I see with
this strategy is that the metaphysical constraint is, if at all, only met on the surface.
The strategy does not ensure that the same entity is responsible both for the truth of
Mary’s having a belief and the truth of her belief, since it does not deal with such
ontological issues at all.
The second strategy also denies the first premise. It relies on an equivalent
reformulation of strong two-dimensional semantics in which both B and Tr operate
on the same kind of semantic entity, the compound proposition. A compound
proposition of a sentence / can be defined as an ordered set h /½ ½ M1 ; h /½ ½ M;c12 ; . . .;
/½ ½ M;cn2 ii; which contains both the primary proposition and the secondary
propositions that / is associated with in a model.23 The model theory has to be
modified accordingly, so that e.g., the valuation function assigns a compound
proposition to each atomic sentence.24A reformulation along these lines moves the
resulting semantics close to what Soames calls hybrid two-dimensionalism.
Effectively changing strong two-dimensionalism to hybrid two-dimensionalism
would beg the question against Soames, since Argument 1 is specifically aimed at
21 From here on, strong two-dimensionalism will be taken to include ST, unless explicitly stated
otherwise.
22 Hofweber (2005) defends a form of ontologically non-committal quantification in the context of
certain inferences, Rayo and Yablo (2001) more generally discuss non-nominal quantification and
ontological commitment.
23 Chalmers (2011) presents a two-dimensionalist theory of attitude ascriptions which employs complex
propositions of a similar kind.
24 Such a valuation function v0 could be defined in the following way: v0 2 fF : P7!hPðCÞ; hhc1;
PðWÞi; . . .; hcn;PðWÞiiig: The first element in the sequence represents the primary proposition, the
elements in the embedded sequence represent secondary propositions relative to the members of C. This
gives us the following semantics:
M; c; w p iff w 2 /½ ½ M2 2 hc; /½ ½ M2 i 2 v0ðpÞ
M; c; w:/ iff M; c; w=;/
M; c; w ð/ ^ wÞ iff M; c; w/ and M; c; ww
M; c; wh/ iff for all w0 : M; c; w0 /
M; c; w@/ iff M; c; c/
M; c; wBð/Þ iff bðhc; wiÞ  /½ ½ M1 2 v0ð/Þ
M; c; w Trð/Þ iff M; c; w/ and 9 c0; w0 so that M; c0; w0 Bð/Þ
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strong two-dimensionalism. The proposed reformulation does however stay clear of
this problem. The defining feature of hybrid two-dimensionalism is its semantics for
B: A belief ascription B (/) is true relative to a world pair c, w iff (a) the relevant
subject accepts a sentence or mental representation M, such that M½ ½ M;c2 ¼ /½ ½ M;c2
and (b) M½ ½ M1 and /½ ½ M1 are appropriately related. 25 I take the basic idea behind
this definition to be that both the primary and the relevant secondary proposition of
a sentence contribute to the truth-conditions for B. This is not the case in the
proposed reformulation of strong two-dimensional semantics. Secondary proposi-
tions are part of the compound proposition that B operates on, but they have no
bearing on the operator’s truth-conditions. Hence, the reformulation does not fall
under Soames’s definition of hybrid two-dimensionalism. This second strategy
seems more promising than the first one: The reformulation of the semantics both
incorporates ST and conforms to the metaphysical constraint by relying on
compound propositions as the basic semantic entities.26
The third strategy is to deny the second premise and to consequently reject the
metaphysical constraint. This move is less radical than it might seem. Strong two-
dimensionalists have to reject a close relative of the constraint in any case, since
their semantics for B and for h operate on two different kinds of propositions. One
could even argue that rejecting the metaphysical constraint allows them to tie their
semantics for Tr closer to their semantics for h, thereby strengthening an intuitive
link between necessity and the truth of beliefs. The crucial question about this
approach is, which impact the denial of the constraint has concerning the adequacy
of a semantic theory. This is a complex question that cannot be fully addressed here.
In the following, I will only give a quick sketch of a general view of semantics that
could be used to vindicate a strong two-dimensionalist’s choice to deny the
metaphysical constraint. On this view, the purpose of semantic theories is to provide
precise models of certain aspects of meaning that adequately reflect our linguistic
practice. In the standard case, the modelled aspect of meaning are the truth
conditions for the sentences of our language. Plausibly, the most important criterion
for the adequacy of a semantic theory of this kind is that the truth values assigned by
it conform to our linguistic practice.27 Whether a semantic theory makes use of one
or multiple kinds of propositions in order to meet this criterion is then only of
secondary interest. A semantic theory that makes use of multiple propositions might
have the vice of not being ontologically parsimonious, but this theory-aesthetic
disadvantage would carry no or only minimal weight concerning the overall
adequacy of the theory. Unless it is shown that strong two-dimensional semantics
with ST fails to deliver truth conditions that adequately reflect our linguistic
practice, its proponents could hence justify rejecting the metaphysical constraint by
adopting the sketched general view of semantics.
25 See Soames (2005b), pp. 313ff for the original definition.
26 Note that the second strategy could rightly be called ad hoc, if it turned out that the only motivation for
the proposed reformulation was its utility for the sketched response to the argument against ST.
27 Lewis could be read as advocating a view like this. See Lewis (1986), chapter 1.2, pp. 40–41.
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